Abstract: HR research rarely focuses on ethical issues and on moral legacies embedded in employees' cultural software. Ignoring the latter can result in a failure to assess important criteria of strategic HR policies, which should not stop at the factory door or at state borders. Recent HR problems experienced in the post-communist countries are cases in point. Hidden injuries of the Cold War include not only the obsolete Russian nuclear submarines waiting for their radioactive spills to enter global food chains. Less visible, but equally dangerous is a moral and an ethical fall-out from Stalinism and the failure to de-Stalinize. An authoritarian mind-set prevents ex-Soviet citizens from discovering, developing and maintaining civic entrepreneurship. Might (of the state) becomes right (for an individual). Lack of civic entrepreneurship makes rede ning collective identity and coming to terms with responsibilities dif cult. The emergence of a symbolic cemetery of Polish of cers, the prisoners-of-war murdered on Stalin's orders in 1940, allows us to trace a mechanism for making state violence transparent and for acknowledging collective responsibilities. Is there a lesson to be learned in managing a social learning process in spite of the learned irresponsibility of 'authoritarian personalities'? Can coming to terms with state-controlled genocide provide a starting point for a re-educational campaign and for coaching in civic virtues? Can the management of moral legacies and ethical responsibilities become part and parcel of a future HR policy for a globally networked world?
entrepreneurship either prompted new organizational forms (e.g. the Polish independent trade union 'Solidarity' of August 1980) or failed to do so (the Russian case of the miners' strikes in the 1990s). Let us, for instance, ask why none of the postcommunist countries can presently be compared to Germany, Italy or Japan twelve years after WWII as far as economic recovery goes? There are three arguments, whose supporters argue that the post-communist moral traumas are much stronger, the hidden injuries of individuals and communities much deeper and the reconstruction of a civil society much more dif cult than was the case with the post-fascist societies (most of these arguments have been collected and critically discussed in Olson (2000) ). They argue, first, that a Russian citizen's obedience results from seventy-five years of a totalitarian communist training and thus can hardly be compared to a German , Italian or a Japanese one. Second, they claim that it is much too early to tell -the first robust symptoms of a German or Italian economic recovery became obvious in the mid-1960s, twenty and not twelve years after the fall of the regime. Third, they claim that a comparison between the post-fascist and post-communist countries is unjusti ed because the former received large-scale Marshall aid, while the latter did not (and therefore it is difficult to predict how the former would have performed without it).
None of these arguments is very convincing. Japanese readiness to follow criminal orders (and to give up criticism as a civic virtue) had been forged in an empire, which lasted longer than a cabinet, which led Japan directly to war. Germans had an authoritarian Prussian state, which legitimized itself by playing a major role in unifying German-speaking territories in the nineteenth century under an 'iron chancellor' (and gave imperial Germany state virtues of 'corpse-like obedience', Kadavergehorsamkeit). The long Soviet totalitarian tradition of Russians (1917-92) had been preceded by an even longer tradition of authoritarian domination of civil society by the tsarist state since the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The argument that one should wait until 2012 to be able to compare the post-fascist and post-communist societies can also be questioned -in 1957 Italian scooters and textiles and German VW 'beetles' and Mercedes cars had already testi ed to the growing competitiveness of reconstructed economies. Russians, however, sell mainly crude oil and minerals (or weapons) in 2001. The third argument appears to carry most weight -could Russia develop more quickly, could Poland or Hungary be on a par with Spain and Portugal now if a Marshall plan had been available in 1945 and the EU in 1985? However, it is hardly a decisive argument in view of major disagreement among economists and political scientists with respect to the impact that the Marshall plan had on national economies after WWII. According to some economists, the in uence of the Marshall plan was economically negligible, as the rapid rate of reconstruction was primarily due to the mobilization of the domestic resources of the European capitalist countries after 1945. However, there may be some truth in the Marshall plan argument. Though economically negligible, it may have been psychologically signi cant.
Most of the discussions around the differences between the aftermath of fascism and that of communism (understood as state socialism of the Stalinist type, gradually softened after Stalin's death) can be summed up as follows: the fall of fascism left much of the market economy militarized and bombed out but functionally well networked, while the fall of communism left much of the economy in a shambles, because the networks created by the communist élites could not be sustained without considerable political pressure distorting the economic chains: 'Actors in the post-socialist societies are rebuilding organizations and institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of communism as they redeploy available resources in response to their immediate practical dilemmas' (Stark 1997: 36) .
Perhaps the most interesting and still insuf ciently explored argument refers to the ruins of communism understood in terms of the hidden moral injuries of a totalitarian collectivism. Stalin collectivized all social resources and imposed a strict centralized system of state controls at all levels and in all walks of life. Blind obedience was expected of every individual and lack of it (or a display of an independent moral judgement) was punished with waves of terror. This system worked in terms of the allocation of resources. Mancur Olson has often quoted an example of the difference in ammunition supplies of German and Russian armies in, respectively, WWI and WWII. German soldiers were getting 2.5 times more ammunition in the latter than the former, but Russian ones 24.5 times more (Olson 2000: 165) . However, centralized control required periodic random terror to prevent lobbies from forming (by accumulating enough trust in various loci of a tight network of state, army, police and party bureaucracies). Had this system survived intact, a massive unlearning of an individual moral responsibility would have occurred and individuals might have started thinking of themselves as cogs in a machine rolling towards a better future and exonerating them of all possible crimes. The above exoneration would have been granted to all accomplices to the programme of state genocide had the implementation of policies decided upon by Stalin been automatically regarded as both necessary and desirable: necessary because there was no other option and desirable because it formed a step towards a better future for the whole of mankind. Parts of this unlearning did, indeed, occur (children were known to denounce parents to the authorities for hiding grain during the Ukrainian famine in the 1930s), but peer networking (among top party of cials or army of cers) did not stop, preventing a complete atomization (and provoking preventive purges of army of cers, secret servicemen, biologists, medical doctors, etc.). This proved to be unfortunate for Stalin. The highest state of cials surrounding him on his deathbed in 1953 (and headed by Khrushchev) mustered enough solidarity to let him die before calling for medical assistance and enough courage to strangle his chief of secret police, Beria, during the closed meeting of the Politburo, thus beginning a slow decline of the Soviet system in its purest, most criminal, Stalinist form. This decline made life easier for citizens and consumers within Soviet Union -no large-scale terror campaigns have been launched after 1956 and there were no attempts to revert to largescale genocide (though limited terror campaigns have been locally initiated after this date and continue to be conducted until the present day).
However, the only moral acts of which Khrushchev was capable concerning the totalitarian Soviet state were his speech to the party congress in 1956 and the relaxation of censorship which made it possible for Solzhenitsyn to publish One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in the literary journal Novyj Mir in 1962. Nothing else was done to pursue the traumas of Stalinism, to reconcile the victims with the institutions of the state and to determine responsibility (for instance, in order to prosecute those who had been guilty of genocide or to prevent similar abuses of state power in future). The state bureaucracies survived untouched and focused on advertising the space programme rather than coming to terms with the moral responsibilities of a citizen of a totalitarian state. One should add that this strange asymmetry between the post-fascist societies (where accomplices in genocide were systematically tracked and punished) and the post-communist ones (where even acknowledged criminals against mankind were not prosecuted) has been much aided by the ideological trench warfare of the Cold War. Because of the role of the state socialist system (led by the USSR) in the ideological constructions of Western leftist thinkers (who tended to return from carefully orchestrated visits to Russia with the press declarations at hand: 'I have seen the future and it works') and because of the skilful global policies of the Russian communists, the question of moral responsibility has never been raised nor systematically pursued. What interests us at present, though, is the answer to the question as to why these hot ethical issues have not been raised now, after the Cold War ended, after Soviet Union fell apart, and civil society started reconstituting itself in the new framework of free elections.
Ethical fall-out
The breakdown of Soviet Union surprised most of the experts, except for the late Andrei Amalrik (who had been wrong, however, thinking that the empire would obligingly fall apart in 1984, con rming Orwell's bleak anti-utopia) and Emmanuel Todd, who predicted it in 1976 (cf. Todd 1976 ) and a number of left and right critics of Stalinism who understood the absurdity of its economic 'base'. Also surprising was a lack of immediate soul-searching and self-criticism among Russian intelligentsia. As soon as the institutional form of the Soviet Union was abandoned, Russians felt en masse that they were the victims who had been liberated from a prison of many nations. None of them asked about the privileged roles of camp guards and secret police interrogators, or about the former privileged position of ethnic Russians. According to most polls, both the military intervention in Lithuania under Gorbachev and an indiscriminate killing of civilians in Chechnya under Putin were approved by a majority of the Russians. This willingness to endorse potentially criminal activities by a Russian government (Gorbachev's paratroopers killed Lithuanians defending a TV station in Vilnius, while Putin's soldiers are still decimating the entire Chechnyan population) can be attributed to various factors.
First, one should stress the fact that the state called the Soviet Union did not fall apart as a result of a mobilization of a powerful political force within Russian society. It was therefore not subjected to a principled internal critique in the light of alternative values defended by a genuine Russian political force. When it has been criticized from abroad, there was usually political capital to be made with an ideological condemnation of 'an evil empire', so Russians themselves did not feel an obligation to respond. Charges expressed in the adjective 'evil' were explained away as the propaganda accusations of a rival empire. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not dismantled according to a blueprint. The implosion was triggered by a power struggle among the members of the party and state power élite trying to save the ruins of an economy which had been increasingly unable to sustain the state machinery of repression:
Gorbachev's policies provide a striking example of the paradox that, at least under certain unfavourable conditions and beyond a certain state of disrepair, the most devastating thing one can do to an old regime is to subject it to groundshaking reforms. (Elster et al. 1998: 13) 1
Peer-Reviewed Articles
Since the breakdown of the state was popularly attributed to these ruinous attempts to reform, the power élite is also expected to repair present companies and institutions and to remedy the present malaise. Citizens' initiatives are usually limited. At the shop oor level they are usually limited to an arrangement between work teams and the foremen or other line managers. On a country level they are limited to the sophisticated intellectual circles of Moscow or St Petersburg who see the necessity of evoking an independent set of values (e.g. within the Helsinki Watch and other human rights committees). On the one hand, there are, thus, individualist strategies of survival with the assistance of family and other personal networks, on the other, a faint attempt to present an alternative to authoritarian values by top intellectual celebrities in the main urban centres. The latter are marginalized and virtually absent from the Russian media.
In the public sphere a majority thus still look up to the symbolic gurehead representing their interest -a good tsar, a reformist party secretary, a strong president. Figureheads, however, become attractive by virtue of promising a majority of voters the security of a 'collective' they identify with and thus further discouraging their emancipation, their social learning, which could lead them towards political organizing and less dependence on powerful figureheads. Accordingly, citizens are forced to choose between the extreme nationalists (who legitimize their programme with the pre-communist tradition of Russian state authoritarianism) and the communists, who base their electoral programme on a promise of return to a totalitarian welfare state. Some political scientists speak of 'a broken-backed democracy':
If there are problems of supply -political elites cannot or will not respect the rule of law, encourage institutions of civil society or act accountably -democracy cannot be completed, even if free elections are held. Such a regime is called a broken-backed democracy, because it is incapable of dealing with the burdens and responsibilities that it faces. There are many examples of democratic regimes that have lasted for decades or generations without becoming complete and without being overthrown, and they are not con ned to postcommunist countries. Within the European Union, Greece and Italy are examples. Within the post-communist world, the Russian Federation shows many signs of a prototypical broken-backed democracy. (Rose et al. 1998: 218) The fact that a broken-backed democracy emerges in a given country has important consequences for the social learning and the accompanying level of organizing. When choices are reduced to a selection of equally authoritarian symbolic gureheads, the emergence of structural changes -for instance, of the independent trade unions and an elaboration of an alternative ideology promoting different values -becomes unlikely:
Workers' desire to be defended by strong leaders during the transition period does not manifest itself only at the mine level; it is also apparent in their attitude towards national politics, in particular in the Kuzbass where the support for the communists is strong. Although workers aspire to the security of collectivism, they can only envisage its realization through the benevolence of the line manager, a paternalistic director, or the president of Russia -each of whom personi es the collective at a speci c level. This alienated collectivism is exerting a major in uence on the development of Russian politics. (Ashwin 1999: 268) Among many consequences of this 'alienated collectivism', the inability to deal with the moral legacy of the Russian and Soviet empires, inability to perform a moral calculus of individual and institutional responsibilities for the crimes of the Soviet state, is crucial. The Communist Party has never been de-legalized in Russia, never compensated its victims and never even discussed an ethical decontamination campaign (one might called it a de-communization project -after the earlier historical example of 'deNazification'). There has been no special tribunal for investigating the crimes of communism, or for a decontamination of homo sovieticus. In a majority of the post-communist countries, the communist parties have either been dissolved or re-named themselves and established social-democratic parties using former communist party activists, professionals and real estate holdings. Even a thin layer of hypocrisy, a lip service paid to social democracy, is already a manifestation of a moral distancing from Stalinism, of a condemnation of it. Not so in Russia -a tacit assumption seems to be that, since the party was in power ('might'), it was free to pursue policies as its members saw t without running the risk of being subjected to a moral judgement ('right'). This is a kind of an ethical fall-out that is much more dif cult to deal with than a physical spillover of the radioactive substances from the rusting submarines in Murmansk. Measurement of the levels of radiation is relatively simple and no amount of secrecy can prevent any major leakage from being detected. However, a widespread indifference to the ethical issues connected to the institutional continuity of a Russian state is not easily detectable and deserves more attention and focused research. They should be studied if one wants to understand how to assist those social forces and actors that are busy building a Russian market-democracy mix and to increase the transparency of public organizations and institutions. It is far from clear, for instance, what are the communities of reference for major social groups, what is the construction of the boundary between the public and the private (now that the omnipotent state has allowed private initiative in economic sphere), who constructs codes of civility and of moral evaluation, etc. (cf. Lamont and Thevenot 2000: 307-27) . Should these studies and research programmes be launched, one might get valuable instruments for stimulating civic entrepreneurship and encouraging developments towards a sustainable democracy and a sustainable non-authoritarian set of values (cf. Przeworski 1995) .
Civic entrepreneurship
What should be done in order to cleanse the ethical fall-out of the communist system? Generally speaking, collective irresponsibility granted by an omnipresent state should be replaced by an individual responsibility felt and exercised by entrepreneurial citizens.
Let us see what has been done so far. Different post-communist societies responded in different ways. East Germans promised all citizens of the former GDR access to their Stasi les and attempted to initiate legal procedures against some of the Stasi employees. The first turned out to be easier than the second. It is an ethical paradox of the totalitarian state that, after its breakdown and moral bankruptcy, it requires a thorough decontamination campaign, but the ethical codes and legal procedures of a democratic society prevent this campaign from achieving its goal. What does a de-communization campaign mean? It means that all decent and honest functionaries of the state should be tried for keeping the machinery of the state functioning, and those found guilty of pursuing the most inhuman policies of wronging individuals and communities should be punished. One may speak of a decontamination campaign in most of the post-communist countries with the exception of Russia (China, North Korea and Cuba also belong to this category, but communists are still in power there). It is possible that sheer termination of the Stalinist terror was enough to pacify Russian population. Every post-Stalinist ruler was perceived as much milder, thus meriting less resistance and critique. Communism has not been as thoroughly criminalized in the post-communist states (and in the eyes of the world's public opinion) as Nazism was in post-Nazi Germany.
Poles, for instance, have reached a round table agreement and the first noncommunist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, gave former communists the chance of a fresh start. He has promised them that a clear red line will be drawn under their doings so far and from that point onwards they will be evaluated according to their present accomplishments, not past sins. Some more radical conservatives were not very happy with this solution, but they have managed to modify it only by introducing a law that a candidate for a public position cannot have a past record of collaborating with secret services. The Czechs have simply barred former communists who held party posts from holding public of ce in a post-comunist Czech republic. The Russians did nothing, since all politicians active today are bound to have a communist past. On the other hand, both Yeltsin and Putin were elected in free elections, in spite of the fact that Putin was not only a communist, but also a career executive of the KGB, in its foreign operations. While this would have been a restriction on his political chances in Germany, Poland or Czech Republic, it did not matter in Russia. Why did Russian citizens fail to impose anti-communist restrictions on their politicians? Does it testify to the lack of civic entrepreneurship in Russian society?
Anyone who has the slightest understanding of how cultures work knows that de ning a culture, saying what it is for members of the culture, is always a major and, even in undemocratic societies, a democratic context. There are cannonical authorities to be selected and regualrly revised, debated, re-selected or dismissed. There are ideas of good and evil, belonging and not belonging (the same and the different), hierarchies of value to be speci ed, discussed, re-discussed and settled or not, as the case may be. Moreover, each culture de nes its enemies, what stands beyond and threatens it. (Said 2000: 577) 2 Civic entrepreneurship usually manifests itself in a refusal to accept civil liberties and participatory decision making at all levels of organizational life as something authorities either allow or ban. One of the main reasons for lack of independent trade unions in the economic and political landscape of Russia after the large wave of coalminers' strikes in the late 1990s is precisely this scarcity of civic entrepreneurship:
'When perestroika and glastnost began, it was easier to change (the forewoman). Now there isn't any glastnost, there's nothing. Now the managers decide everything again. But before perestroika it was absolutely impossible. Gorbachev gave us some rights . . . he allowed the collective to decide everything. Now there is very little that is decided by the collective'. What is notable about this account is the passive role it accurately accords to workers in the process: rights are given and taken away rather than fought for or defended. (Ashwin 1999: 258) If a member of a work collective has so little real choice and depends so much on the authoritarian power-holder, how can he or she undertake a much more sophisticated and dif cult analysis of his or her cultural identity? How can he or she identify with an ethnic group, if for most of its recorded history it has been managed by an authoritarian or even totalitarian state, responsible for crimes committed in its service? How can he or she explain his or her inability to deal with the willing executioners of the Stalinist state? For instance, with those who shot twenty thousand Polish of cers in the backs of their heads in 1940? We tend to think that no amount of denial ('Ich habe es nicht gewusst') can exonerate Stalin's willing executioners. But how to convince them and their families, the rest of society and the law enforcement agencies that these individuals should undergo a de-communization or a moral decontamination process in order to understand that it is wrong not to formulate such questions? How to convince them that prolonged and consistent pressure exercised by the Polish government and non-governmental organizations to publish historical details of the Katyn massacre, to open the Polish military cemeteries on the sites where the victims had been buried in mass graves, to include data on this act of genocide in historical handbooks -that all of this is a service paid by the Polish civic entrepreneurs (aided by Russian and Byelorussian NGOs) to their Russian fellow-citizens, not an attempt to humiliate them as descendants of slaves and servants of an empire? This question can be answered only if we are able to outline a social learning curve and find out if crucial questions have been asked and subjected to an open public discussion. Degree of responsibility and degree of acknowledgment of the moral trouble with our cultural legacies can be measured only in an intuitive way. British citizens alive in 2001 cannot be held responsible for crimes committed by the British Army in India in the nineteenth century. But they could have been held responsible for whitewashing their cultural legacy if Orwell had failed to publish Burmese Days or V. S. Naipaul had to submit his novels to a state censor. We should also point out that what gives us, on the other side of the former 'iron curtain', a right to expect cleansing rituals in Russia ( i.e. coming to terms with their genocidal past) is that we are undergoing them ourselves. We subject our activities to a moral scrutiny, even if results are unpleasant to accept. Take globalization, for instance:
The dominating discourse of the global market is represented as the only alternative, as the modern alternative, and other cultural forms are seen as backward. . . . The incomplete and inadequate nature of the individualization produced by the global market could be thus highlighted, and opened up for the emergence of competing discourses that define globalization from multiple perspectives. It is then important to ask oneself what kind of powers are involved in constituting one's identity and actions in order to begin to challenge the discourse at the individual level. As a result, the discourse of globalization could be challenged by multiple alternative discourses which coexist and blend with each other, bringing the normalizations produced into focus and potentially leading to a transformation to the dominant system of thought. (Penttinen 2000: 219) 3 In this type of a transformation we are usually dealing with a social learning curve as de ned by Boisot (1995 Boisot ( , 1999 .
Social learning curve
Not many contemporary social scientists believe in an invisible hand of a market (though transaction cost theory seems to be still a dominant paradigm in economics) and some if not most would agree that a governance structure imposed by a state responsive to civil society should guide this not-so-invisible hand. One of the reasons for the establishment of this governance structure is a necessity to safeguard a shift of resources from loss-making to profit-making undertakings. The more smoothly this shift takes place, the more prosperous a given country becomes. Once we scan the list of the countries which are prosperous -so goes this reasoning -we can notice that their prosperity is proportional to their safeguarding of individual rights and individuals' unequal profits (deviations from this pattern -for instance, autocratic countries in south-east Asia -are explained away as local variations on a global theme, with collective security replacing individual freedom as the guiding ideal). Unequal pro ts of companies are -of course -a powerful generator of inequalities. If a governance system supplies solid guarantees of individual rights, everybody can be sure that success (and increase in inequality) will not be punished. Safeguarding individual rights is important from the economic point of view, but even more so from the point of political participation, of civic entrepreneurship and of a social learning process. Since the evolution of organizational forms proceeds through the generation of novelty and variety and by a subsequent selection from it, a preservation of a freedom to generate variety is very important. Preserving such freedom -for instance, by adhering to 'universal values' and respecting the rights of an individual -societies are keeping the stage set for new dress rehearsals of potentially evolutionarily 'pro table' organizational inventions:
The single-minded pursuit of a neoclassical market order in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, for example, by stifling the institutional variety necessary for social learning to take root, may turn out to inhibit rather than to stimulate capitalist processes. And paradoxically, China, if it succeeds in effectively accomodating embryonic markets in a culture that still remains strongly invested in clans and efs, may get closer to successfully operating a social learning curve than post-communist Europe. The Marxist-Leninist proclamations of the ageing Chinese leaders notwithstanding, China will harbour the institutional variety necessary for genuine capitalist evolution. (Boisot 1995: 440) 4 The Russian social learning curve should be monitored especially closely in view of the fact that, in spite of the initial impulse of glastnost, the learning process did not result in any durable organizational restructuring preventing illegal or state monopolies, or in more democratic political and social arrangements for the majority of Russians in their daily environments. The democratization of a formal electoral system has already been introduced, but a profound and broad discussion on the present consequences of a past totalitarian destruction of values still waits for a political owner. No one can democratize social relations and a political system without making his or her party's ideology compatible with the prevalent values and goals. But what should we do if these values and goals re ect the long tradition of enslavement in authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes? Are genuine, embedded cultural values of Russians those of the 'cunning slaves'? How can we impose civic values on Russians from above (thus prolonging the vicious circle of authoritarian, top-down modernization cycles in Russian history)? Can we start with the decontamination of the basic places of socializationfamily, school and workplace? We should, perhaps, develop an international programme of cultural and ethical post-totalitarian decontamination (a suggestion already made by a countercultural, young, artistic group trying to counter a government propaganda machine in Milosevic's Serbia). We should, perhaps, try to have it embedded in networked communities of alternative social movements (thinkers as diverse as Castells, Sen and Melucci have been experimenting with this instrument of egalitarian corrections of the excessive control performed by states and markets). Some movements for the restoration of the cemeteries and mass graves of the victims of Stalinism have already achieved a modest degree of success in Russia and other post-Stalinist states. They deserve attention and assistance. A visit to the graves of the Polish of cers murdered in Katyn in 1940 might be an interesting starting point for the revised history handbooks project (there is a precedent in the Polish-German joint history handbook and international know-how on the management of such joint commissions). Russian schoolchildren might start learning about their national history from the books which offer a more balanced, less nationalistic point of view. They might start learning that their parents and grandparents occupied both the victims' and the henchmen's positions in the Soviet social system and that they themselves should rehearse identi cation not only proudly with military victories but also with the responsibility of some of their fathers for state-organized genocide. A visit by school children to the graves of the Polish officers would symbolically reveal the painful, criminal record of the Soviet empire, contrasting with the streamlined propaganda vision of World War II as the great defensive war for the Soviet motherland, and stimulating an independent, individual critical view of national history. The precondition of success is that the Russians themselves decide that they welcome a decontamination, that they want to start a re-education campaign -not to put the Russians to shame as Russians, 5 but to remind them that 'there is a limited set of deontological values that speak to all people, although in nonfree societies awareness of these might be supressed' (Etzioni 2001: 245) 6 Might, right and nuclear weapons Doubts concerning feasibility of this ethical clean-up campaign arise once we realize that there is another major difference between an accomplished de-Nazi cation project in Germany after 1945 and a potential de-Sovietization project in Russia at the turn of the twenty-rst century, namely, nuclear weapons. When German Nazis were defeated in 1945, they had to surrender unconditionally and a campaign of de-Nazi cation was imposed on them by the victorious allied governments. When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1992, the world's second largest nuclear arsenal remained operational and the political and military élite of the Russian Federation continued to control it. The other governments were more focused on the quality of this control, less on an ethical fallout campaign.
Triggering a public debate in Russia, one could employ many cases. For the purposes of the present paper on a possible global HR policy based on a post-Soviet decontamination campaign, the case of the Katyn massacre. In 1940 of cers and soldiers of the Russian secret service killed c. 20,000 Polish of cers by shooting them in the back of their heads and burying them in mass graves near Katyn. The massacre of the Polish POWs was not an extraordinary undertaking -large groups of Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians or Lithuanians have also been executed and their bodies buried in mass graves by Stalin's secret services. However, what made it different was, rst of all, a determined campaign by the victims' families to reconstruct their fate and the fact that, after Hitler's break with Stalin and his invasion of Soviet Union, the mass graves have been found and bodies of the victims identi ed. The Soviet authorities dismissed this discovery, claiming that it was Nazi propaganda. When this lie was unmasked by the independent experts from the Swedish Red Cross, the Soviet authorities forced the allied governments to keep silent about this crime, claiming that the Russian contribution to the war effort was more important than honouring victims of genocide. After the fall of the Soviet Union the case has been thoroughly investigated, documents from KGB archives recovered (with Stalin's hand-written command), graves unearthed and researched, Polish military cemeteries and monuments built and opened on the sites of the massacre, con rming Brzezinski's brief indictment: 'Communism will be remembered largely as the twentieth century's most extraordinary political and intellectual aberration' (Brzezinski 1989: 1) 7 Or in Malia's bitter diagnosis of the ethical fallout of the Soviet period:
The most debilitating and antimodern aspect of Sovietism has been its effect on the population's mentality: it left behind an envious egalitarianism, a suspicion that entrepreneurship is speculation, the re ex of responding to administrative commands rather than to market incentives, and the dulling pall cast by Marxist-Leninist dogma over habits of critical thought. To these must be added the depressing awareness that boundless sacri ces had only produced national failure, and that the country had wasted, in the folk phrase, 'seventy years on the road to nowhere'. (Malia 1994: 510) 8 In view of the above statement and against the background of global networking of states, markets and other agencies, a cultural decontamination programme as suggested above could form part and parcel of strategic HR policies pursued by the supranational organizations. Such policies should not stop at the factory door, neither should they stop in front of a nation-state border. Let us hope that the ghosts of the Cold War (once rekindled during the brief period of intervention in Kosovo) will not emerge as hot mobilization issues reinforcing the grip of the authoritarian state on post-communist Russians and dismantling the decontamination efforts of an emergent civil society. An attempt at the formulating of a global HR policy manifested in the Helsinki agreement of the Committee of the European Security and Cooperation (the human rights clause) could then become a stepping stone towards a more global and more systematically pursued HR policy for a networked global society.
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1 Or, as another author puts it, 'Had the consequences of Gorbachev's reform initiatives been known in advance, it would have encouraged such bunker mentality that no change would have been attempted. Differently put, Gorbachev destroyed state socialism perfectly because he was blind' (Hall 1995: 34) . 2 In a different essay Said writes that '[m] issing from the panorama Hobsbawm presents is the underlying drive or thrust of a particular era. . . . The twentieth century after all is a great age of resistance, and that has not completely been silenced ' (2000: 481-3) . 3 The editors of the volume write in an epilogue printed behind Penttinen's contribution:
'The analysis of contemporary power in the international system, which often functions as a context for individuals, organizations, networks of private and public actors, and states, has produced a great variety of continuities and discontinuities' (2000: 221-2). 4 Boisot has, of course, a slightly different view of capitalism as a global system than as a neoclassical, market-focused one. Thus he writes: 'Social learning is a creative destruction at work. It is the essence of capitalism as described by Schumpeter and as understood by Marx. The neoclassical orthodoxy by equating capitalism with markets, a single staging post along the social learning curve, ignores its evolutionary character ' (1995: 439-40) . A similar suggestion has been made in a different context by Ian Shapiro, who wanted to probe into family and workplace in order to nd a compromise between liberalism and communitarianism and to outline the principles of demoratic justice (Shapiro 1999) 5 Cf. Etzioni, who claims that shaming may be a preferred alternative to jailing and offers, half-seriously, the following advice: 'Young drug dealers, caught for the rst time peddling, should be sent home with their heads shaved and without their pants instead of being jailed ' (2001: 37) . However, collective shaming in the case of Russia (or China for that matter) might easily deteriorate into a manifestation of Western superiority, which would certainly fail to trigger self-analysis among the new Russians. 6 Etzioni does realize that the most important values are inherited from a community we are embedded in and not from a state we are subjected to -hence family or workplace might offer better starting points for a decontamination (re-education in civic entrepreneurship and rehabilitation of civic virtues) of the post-communist Russians than a school. 7 Brzezinski clearly demonstrates numerous parallels between the Nazis and the Bolsheviks, but does not analyse the reasons for the perfect asymmetry with which Nazi and Bolshevik genocide has been treated so far: 'Institutionally, Hitler learned from Lenin how to construct a state based on terror, complete with its elaborate secret police apparatus, its reliance on the concept of group culpability in dispensing justice, and its orchestrated show trials ' (1989: 7-8) . The difference is that Stalin was able to legitimize his genocide for much longer, which made the moral condemnation of the 'left' genocide much more dif cult than the one perpetrated by the 'right'. Even today, terrorist actions of right-wing militias in the USA are condemned more easily than terrorist excesses of the anti-globalization protesters (who tend to be associated with the 'left'). 8 What Malia says about Russia is echoed by Berend speaking of the central European postcommunist states: 'After a century of revolts against peripheral backwardness, after several, though different types of, revolutions and four decades of desperate experiment, in the end always ended up where they had started. After its long detour, Central and Eastern Europe was still languishing on the periphery of Europe' (Berend 1998: xvi) .
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